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Relativity of Simultaneity and Eternalism: In Defense of Blockworld





	Ever since the now infamous comments made by Hermann Minkowski in 1908 concerning the proper way to view space-time, the debate has raged as to whether or not the universe should be viewed as a four-dimensional, unified whole wherein the past, present, and future are equally real or whether the views espoused by the possibilists, historicists, and presentists regarding the unreality of the future (and, for presentists, the past) are best. Now, a century after Minkowski’s proposed blockworld first sparked debate, we seek a more conclusive argument in favor of the eternalist picture of space-time. Utilizing an argument based on the relativity of simultaneity in the tradition of Putnam and Rietdijk and novel but reasonable assumptions as to the nature of “reality”, we will show that the past, present, and future are equally real, thus ruling out presentism and other theories of time that bestow special ontological status to the past, present, or future as untenable. Finally, we will respond to our critics who would suggest that: 1) there is no metaphysical difference between the positions of eternalism and presentism, 2) the present must be defined as the “here” as well as the “now”, or 3) presentism is correct and our understanding of relativity is incomplete because it does not incorporate a preferred frame. We call eternalist response 1 deflationary since it purports to dissolve or deconstruct the age-old debate between the two views and response 2 compatibilist because it does nothing to alter special relativity (SR) arguing instead that SR unadorned has the resources to save presentism. Response 3 we will call incompatibilism because it adorns SR in some way in order to save presentism a la some sort of preferred frame.  We will show that neither move 1 nor 2 can save presentism and move 3 is not well motivated at this juncture except as an ad hoc device to refute eternalism.

I. Introduction 
	The following are several distinct, though frequently conflated, deeply related issues in the metaphysics of time:

(i)	Are all events, past, present and future, real?
(ii)	Is there temporal passage or objective becoming?
(iii)	Does tensed language have tenseless truth conditions?
(iv)	Does time have a privileged direction?

This paper will focus almost exclusively on question (i). In the philosophy of time, this major conundrum has captivated philosophers for decades now. This problem stems from two competing notions of time. The first, suggested by Heraclitus, is called presentism. Though we will later clarify the presentist position in more definite terms so that it can be made relevant to a more thorough and modern treatment of presentist/eternalist debate, a good starting definition for presentism is the view that the present is the only real temporal frame; both the past and the future are unreal​[3]​. This view is close to, but not exactly the same as, possibilism, which states that the future is unreal while both the past and the present are real. Both of these stances adequately capture the manifest human perception of time. We view ourselves as occupying a unique temporal frame that we call the present that always moves away from the past, which we may or may not remember, towards an uncertain future.
	However, with the advent of relativity, a new stance, one primarily supported in ancient times by Parmenides of Elea, emerged as an alternative to Heraclitean presentism. This new stance, eternalism, was translated into the language of relativity of Hermann Minkowski in 1908 to suggest that time and space should be united in a single, four-dimensional manifold. Thus arose the notion of a 4D “blockworld” (BW) in which the past, present, and future are all equally real. This view is called eternalism, and two arguments by Putnam​[4]​ and Rietdijk​[5]​ allegedly show that SR with its relativity of simultaneity (RoS) implies that only the BW perspective can obtain.
	This paper will proceed as follows. First, we examine the basic structure of the RoS eternalism argument suggested by Putnam, Rietdijk, and more recently Stuckey, Silberstein, and Cifone​[6]​(hereafter SSC) and present our own basic argument for eternalism in this vein. Following this proposal, we suggest various points of contention that presentists and possibilists might exploit or have exploited in seeking to either refute eternalism or collapse the presentism/eternalism dichotomy.  We have compiled a reasonably exhaustive taxonomy of possible outs that the presentist or possibilist could take to avoid the argument from RoS for BW​[7]​. After elaborating our own version of the argument, we respond to each counter-argument and show that these objections do not dismiss the problems that RoS presents for presentism.

II.1 General Outline and Definition of Terms 
Before presenting our RoS argument against presentism, we will first provide a general outline of such an argument and give preliminary definitions for some relevant terms. The general form of the arguments against presentism utilized by Putnam, Rietdijk, and SSC goes as follows: 
		1. Define presentism
		2. Define the term “co-real”​[8]​
		3. Show that the consequences of the definition of the term “co-real” and RoS
		contradict presentism
		4. Conclude that presentism is false from the conjunction of 1 and 3
		5. Conclude that eternalism is true from the rejection of presentism  
To begin with, then, we must define the terms that will form the foundation for much of the argument to come. The first necessary term to define is “presentism”. Presentism is a kind of realism that takes as real only those events​[9]​ which occur in the present. For instance, since we are sitting next to our friend Joe who is currently reading a paper, the event of his reading a paper and the event of our typing this paper are both real while the event of Joe’s leaving to eat dinner is not real because it has not happened yet and the event of our leaving to eat lunch is not real because it has already happened. In terms of simultaneity, then, one can define presentism as the view that the only real things are those which are simultaneous with a given present event. Eternalism, by contrast, is the view that all things that are past, present, and future have equal reality. Thus, Joe’s reading, our typing, Joe’s leaving for dinner, and our leaving for lunch are all equally real despite the fact that one of these events has already occurred while another has yet to occur. Thus, eternalists hold that all events are equally real, regardless of whether or not said events are simultaneous.
	There are two elements, then, that are important for establishing both presentism and eternalism: reality and simultaneity. The debate presupposes that there is a unique (non-equivocal) sense of the term reality that both sides share. The dispute therefore is over whether or not present events have some ontologically privileged status qua their property of “existing at time some time t where t is in the present”. To this end we will first minimally characterize the terms “reality” and “simultaneity” for use in the context of this debate. Before beginning, we should emphasize that we are being purposefully vague with our first characterization of reality here so as to determine reality’s most general non-equivocal properties which we will build upon later in our paper. We take “reality” in the context of this debate to be a relational property of a given event. Two events which “share reality” as we characterize it share a single, unique feature (i.e., the same ontological status with respect to realness); this uniqueness, we believe, is the absolute minimal criterion an event would have to satisfy for it to be considered “real” in any meaningful sense of the word.
	To better understand the minimal sense of reality at work here, we define two separate principles: the “reality value” and “reality relation.” “Reality values” or “R-values” can be thought of as the ontological status of any given event. Within space-time, every event can be assigned an R-value that represents its ontological status, and there is a one-to-one and onto mapping of possible R-values onto ontological statuses. In the interests of defining reality generally, we will not attempt to enumerate how many R-values exist, but one could easily take reality to be binary and thus assert that, for any event, if its R-value is 1, that event “is real”, and if its R-value is 0, that event “is not real.” One could use higher values like 2 and higher to denote other states, such as “possibly real”, “real in the future”, etc., but, as previously stated, we will not attempt to enumerate all such possible R-values here. It should be pointed out that our uniqueness criterion on reality translates into this system simply as the claim that every event has a single unique R-value. This seems intuitive since an event with an R-value of both 1 and 0, on our scheme, would be both real and unreal, making it contradictory.
	Our other sense of reality as expressed in the “reality relation” will be essential to our discussion of co-reality. The reality relation can be recast as the idea of “equal reality” and exists between any two or more events that can be considered “equally real.” Translated in terms of R-values, a reality relation exists between any two events that must have the same R-value. For instance, if events A and B are equally real, then the R-value of event A is the same as the R-value of event B. One should notice here that our definition of “equally real” does not assume that two equally real events are both “real”; equally real events A and B may have whatever R-value you please as long as the R-values are the same for both of them. This explains what a presentist means when she says, “The present is the only thing that is real” since the presentist will hold that events in the future and the past will have different R-values from events in the present​[10]​. Thus, our purposefully limited characterization of the “equally real” relation has been defined so as to be useful in a definition of co-reality.
	As for simultaneity, if it is possible for one to construct a hyperplane of simultaneity (i.e. a manifold in space-time that connects two space-like separated observers or events) between any two or more events, then these events are said to be simultaneous.  Such simultaneous events are required to be space-like separated. Light-like and time-like separated events cannot have a hyperplane of simultaneity constructed between them in any sub-luminal reference frame. Also, a hyperplane of simultaneity may be drawn between any two space-like separated events, meaning that the space-like separation of events A and B is necessary and sufficient for their simultaneity. 
	Combining the criteria of equal reality (“equally real” means that two events have the same R-value) and simultaneity (“simultaneous” means that two events are space-like separated such that a hyperplane of simultaneity can be constructed between the two events in some frame) gives us the relation of “co-reality”, which refers to, as the name suggests, two events that are equally real “simultaneously.” The presentist perspective can be restated in terms of this “co-reality” as the stance that “co-reality between events is a necessary and sufficient condition for the reality (that is, for both events sharing the R-value 1 corresponding to “real”) of these events if at least one of these events occurs in the ‘present’ ”. This restatement of presentism in terms of co-reality is the assumption that we alluded to in step 1 above.
	Our previous examples should make our notion of co-reality more explicit. For instance, Joe’s paper reading and our paper typing are co-real events as per this criterion because they are space-like separated, meaning that there exists some frame in which these two events are simultaneous. However, our paper typing and our leaving for lunch are time-like separated, so there is no frame in which these two events are simultaneous​[11]​ and they are therefore not co-real.  These two criteria of reality and simultaneity as we have defined them are necessary and sufficient for our use of “co-real”, and so we turn next to our RoS argument that utilizes this definition of “co-real” to reveal the contradictory nature of presentism when combined with relativity. 

II.2 RoS Argument 
	Consider the following situation: our friends John and Josephine stub their toes at the same time in my stationary reference frame​[12]​. The event of John stubbing his toe is labeled A in Figure 1 and the event of Josephine stubbing her toe is labeled as B in Figure 1: 


Figure 1: RoS Proof Space-Time Diagram

At a later time (but again, simultaneously in our rest frame), both Josephine and John shout in pain from stubbing their respective toes. John’s shout of pain is labeled A' while Josephine’s shout of pain is labeled B' in Figure 1. I note that in my frame, both toe-stubs occur at time t1 in Figure 1. Thus, events A and B are co-real as per the previously-established criteria. 
	Now, some time before this the alien battle cruisers P and D pass each other directly over our heads. The primed axes refer to the frame for battle cruiser P and the double-primed axes refer to the frame for battle cruiser D. Both of these battle cruisers tell a different story from ours. For battle cruiser P events B and A' occur at the same time, and thus B and A' are co-real. For battle cruiser D, however, events B' and A occur at the same time, and thus B' and A are co-real. 










Generalizing from this result, then, one can conclude that a prior event (the stubbing of a toe) is as real as a later event (a shout of pain). If the first event (A, for instance) occurs in the “present”, then A' occurs in the future and the RoS argument suggests that the future is as real as the present. Likewise, if A' occurs in the present, then A occurs in the past and the RoS argument suggests that the past is as real as the present. Both of these conclusions contradict the presentist assertion that the present is real while the past and future are not since past, present, and future must share reality equally by the above argument. Thus, since presentism in conjunction with relativity and our other basic assumptions leads to a contradiction, presentism must be false given our assumptions. Finally, since variations of this argument would answer equally well anyone who would argue that only the past is real or only the future is real, the only conclusion left for a realist is that eternalism must be correct since both presentism and possibilism must be discarded.

III. Presentist Points of Contention 
	There are several points in the above argument for eternalism that presentists (or anti-realists, for that matter) could attack or have attacked. The point of this section is to provide a basic taxonomy of points of contention presentists utilize or could utilize to disagree with both the argument presented above and eternalism in general.

III.1 Deflationary Objections: No Presentist/Eternalist Distinction 
	The first attack on the RoS argument which works equally well on any argument trying to prove or disprove eternalism is that there is, in fact, no metaphysical or empirical distinction between the views supported by presentists and those supported by eternalists. This collapse of the dichotomy between presentism and eternalism is most ardently supported by Savitt​[15]​ and Dorato​[16]​ in recent papers. Both of these papers utilize semantic arguments to suggest that the distinction between presentism and eternalism boils down to a difference in definitions for “real” which translates, in various contexts, to differences in tensed versus tenseless existence claims. These two authors claim that presentism and eternalism are both essentially either tautological when viewed with the proper definition of existence (for instance, to say that the present is the only thing that “exists now” is tautological since “now” is defined in terms of the present) or contradictory when viewed with the improper sense of existence (for instance, to say that the present is the only thing that “exists tenselessly” is to ignore the past and future that are assumed in the phrase “exists tenselessly”). These two authors go on to attack various defenses of eternalism that rely on modality and various other semantic considerations, leading them to the conclusion that the problem posed by the presentist/eternalist debate is truly a non-problem by way of a “Wittgenstein-like” or “Austin-like” deflation.
	In an earlier paper​[17]​, Dorato brings in various other semantic arguments against eternalism specifically in an attempt to show how eternalism is as problematic as presentism. The first contention Dorato raises is against the eternalist perspective that “the past, present, and future are all real at the same time”, which he views as meaningless since one cannot say anything about the relationship between the past, present, and future at a given time since all three entities cannot be simultaneous. There must be a temporal separation between the past, present, and future for them to be well defined, so any statement about how the past, present, and future interact at a given time collapses this distinction and thus becomes meaningless. The second argument against eternalism on semantic grounds is that an eternal truth like “event A takes place at time t” may be timeless, but the object of this statement, event A, is not necessarily as timeless as the statement about it. Dorato thus believes that eternalism confuses the following two statements:
		1. “X is the case at t” is an eternal truth
		2. X exists eternally
And thus, since eternalism makes this error, is it somewhat a nonsensical position to hold. These two linguistic objections to eternalism, as well as the much larger objection that there is no metaphysical presentist/eternalist dichotomy, will be addressed later in this paper.

III.2 Compatibilist and Incompatibilist Objections 
	Two other groups of people who reject the RoS argument for BW are the compatibilists and incompatibilists. Compatibilist philosophers of time appeal to a given space-time invariant quantity (like the fact that all inertial frames agree on the ordering of time-like events or the existence of a “proper time”) to hang presentism upon​[18]​ Incompatibilists, on the other hand, invoke some preferred frame or other entity with which to adorn Minkowski space-time in hopes that this new frame will provide a suitable place to hang presentism and becoming. These positions constitute a shift in the definition of “co-reality” as it we presented previously. Both compatibilists and incompatibilists would reject our definition and propose another, though various compatibilists and incompatibilists will propose differing versions of “co-reality”. There are essentially three ways philosophers can and do object to the RoS argument:
1. Reject our characterization of simultaneity in our definition of co-reality (redefine simultaneity, compatibilist and incompatibilist objection)
2. Reject our characterization of reality in our definition of co-reality (reject transitivity of co-reality, compatibilist objection)
	3. Reject the conjunction of simultaneity and reality in our co-reality definition (compatibilist objection)
Move 1 can and has been justified on several different grounds. It has most famously been argued that either a) simultaneity is not a suitable criterion for reality because the present refers to only the “here and now”, not simply the now, and b) simultaneity should be in reference to some preferred foliation of space-time​[19]​. Objection a) is raised most famously by Stein​[20]​ in his response to Putnam and objection b) has been raised by various philosophers and physicists who have rather disparate views as to what the preferred foliation of space-time is and from whence it issues​[21]​. We will address both of these objections to the RoS argument individually in the following sections.  
	Compatibilist move 2 is typically raised either by those like Savitt​[22]​ and Dolev​[23]​ who believe that an argument for a transitive reality has not and cannot be convincingly made especially within the framework of SR or by anti-realists (including solipsists) who believe that the phrase “reality” should only pertain to one’s own frame (or, worse yet, only to oneself). The first of these objections is then the only one particularly relevant to the presentist/eternalist debate because an anti-realist  would no sooner be a presentist than an eternalist. The transitivity of “is co-real with” is objected to on this view precisely because it leads to the view that presentism is wrong. Thus, it seems like any presentist interested in saving her stance would object to the transitivity of co-reality implied by our definition of reality as many before her have chosen to do.
	Compatibilism 3 is one that we have never seen in the literature anywhere, and perhaps with good reason because it seems as if it would be a particularly confusing stance to take. Such an objection would state that our characterizations of simultaneity and reality are good enough on their own but that the definition of “co-real” they lead to when combined is unacceptable. This objection boils down to a belief that the whole is “more than the sum of its parts” in some way for our co-reality definition.  One might be led to this view from the fact that simultaneity is a frame-dependent quantity while reality is a frame-independent quantity.  Someone raising the objection found in Compatibilism 3 could argue that the frame-dependence, which is treated differently in our definitions of simultaneity and reality, is lost in the definition of “co-reality” which is nonsensically both frame-dependent and frame-independent. Thus, to say that two things are both simultaneous and real “at once” would be to suggest a contradiction to the mind of one agreeing with Compatibilism 3. The problem for one raising this objection, however, is what stance to take on the presentism/eternalism debate in the absence of co-reality. One could be a presentist, but if there is no more co-reality, the only things that would be real would be the “here and now” of the point presentist, a perspective we have already described. In the absence of point presentism, the non-existence of co-reality might lead to some form of anti-realism. Thus, though the perspective of Compatibilism 3 does raise some valid concerns, any presentist raising this objection is forced into one of the objections we have already described. Compatibilism 3 boils down to either rejecting our characterization of simultaneity or our characterization of reality since one of our characterizations must be flawed if their synthesis, co-reality, is meaningless. Thus, if we prove that both criteria 1 and 2 are misguided in isolation, than we will have proven that the conjunction is misguided as well. Compatibilism 3 does not raise any new objection to or alternative perspective on the RoS argument, and as such, addressing Compatibilism 1 and 2 will be sufficient to address Compatibilism 3.

IV. Response to Objections​[24]​

IV.1 Defining Terms: Establishing a Metaphysical Presentist/Eternalist Distinction
	Dorato and Savitt claim that there is no metaphysical or empirical distinction between the eternalist and presentist perspectives by utilizing several definitions for reality in terms of the words “is”, “exists”, and “real”. In general, Dorato and Savitt make an excellent point in suggesting some of the shoddy conclusions that linguistic sloppiness can engender in the presentist/eternalist debate. Our goal in this section, however, is to show that, given the proper definition of reality, a metaphysical and empirical distinction between the presentist and eternalist positions still arises. Such a definition is sufficient to counter Dorato’s and Savitt’s collapse.
	Our definition of reality relies upon two independent concepts: “definiteness” and “distinctness”. For an event to be real, we posit, it must be the case that this event is both definite and distinct. Our use of first of these terms certainly needs a great deal of explication. What does it mean for an event to be “definite”? A definite event must have a meaningful, determined outcome. A useful example of the distinction between definite and indefinite can be found in quantum mechanics. With respect to a particular variable like spin in the x-direction, a quantum system may be in a superposition or an eigenstate if it is in a pure state instead of a statistical mixture. If you have a multitude of systems in the same eigenstate, a measurement of the spin in the x-direction will always yield the same value no matter which of these systems you measure. Thus, we say that an eigenstate of x-spin is definite with respect to spin in the x-direction. However, if the system is in a superposition with respect to x-spin, different systems prepared in the same x-spin superposition may give different x-spin values when measured. There is no way for the value of the x-spin of such a mixed state after measurement to be predicted given any information about the system prior to measurement, and as such, the superposition of x-spin is said to be indefinite with respect to x-spin.   
	We should note here that our definiteness criterion is taken to be an objective criterion of a system, and as such, unlike the quantum example previously given, a system must be indefinite with respect to all of its properties to be considered indefinite qua system. Therefore, though one might be tempted to say that the superposition in the previous example is objectively indefinite and is, therefore, not real qua our reality condition, this is not the case, for with respect to the property “in a superposition of x-spin eigenstates”, the superposition is most certainly definite; it is only the x-spin value of such a superposition that is indefinite. If a given event is definite with regard to any property, it is taken to be objectively definite, and thus it may be real (as long as it meets the distinctness criterion as well, that is). It should also be pointed out that definiteness is an objective property events in the universe; though different observers may disagree about the state of a given system (as Rovelli​[25]​points out in his paper on relational quantum mechanics), they will all agree that it is definite on our definition of definiteness. To agree on definiteness in this way means that all observers must agree that an event occurs and that the outcome of a process must be seen to follow the beginning of a process. This latter criterion is clearly an objective one since all observers in non-tachyonic frames will perceive a “cause” coming before an “effect”. 
	The other criterion for a real event is that the event be distinct. This involves the event being in some way different from other events (call it the discernability of non-identicals). Such a criterion for the distinctness of events is different from a criterion that would require the distinctness of particles. While it may be that two indistinguishable particles can both be real, the issue of concern here is the reality of events, and it is the case that two indistinguishable events cannot both be real per the identity of indiscernables.  For two events to be indistinguishable they must not be numerically distinct. Indistinguishable events must occur, then, at both the same place and the same time. This criterion of indistinguishability may be viewed as a more pragmatic concern (why should we take one thing to be real if all of its properties are the same as something else that is already in existence?).  Such a criterion of reality would keep one from treating as real two “events” that seem to be different but are truly one and the same event. If we call the event of a car hitting a wall “event A”, then there is no need for us to count as “real” the event of the wall hitting the car; they are simply two different ways of viewing the same real event. Think for example of Lorentz transformations from different reference frames on the same event. Such a consideration is already taken into account by the pre-established existence of “event A”, and so one need not take such an event to be “real” because it would be redundant and empty to do so.  
	Having established these two criteria for reality, does there appear to be a difference between the presentist and eternalist positions? The answer is “yes” because it is not tautological or contradictory that the past and future be viewed as definite and distinct. The presentist claims that past and future events lack both/either definiteness and distinctness simpliciter while the eternalist says all events past, present and future possess both definiteness and distinctness. The first fact to note about the future (and the past, for those with faulty memories) is that it is unknown to us. One might be even tempted to say that it appears indefinite since it seems, qua quantum uncertainty on some interpretations, that there is no way for us to know the future no matter how much we know about the present. This leads to a distinction, however, between objective indefiniteness and subjective indefiniteness. That which we call objective indefiniteness is indefiniteness of the kind we have already described. On the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics for example, the “uncertainty” of what eigenstate a superposition will “collapse” to post-measurement is a fact about the world regardless of an observer’s point of view or state of knowledge. Such objective indefiniteness means that even to “Newton’s god”, an entity in the 5th or higher dimension “looking down” at her space-time “sensorium”, the results of a quantum measurement are completely indefinite. Obviously by way of contrast, predicting outcomes of a classical coin toss involves mere subjective indefiniteness, typically called a function of ignorance. 
	The eternalist position is thus firmly established: an eternalist believes that events in the past, present and future relatively speaking are all equally real in that they are all objectively definite (i.e., only subjectively indefinite) and distinct. This means that it is possible to tell two past events apart or two future events apart even in the present and that these events are all objectively determined even if one does not know the results of such determination. This characterization of reality also provides two paths to presentism: a presentist could believe that the future and the past are unreal either because past and future events are indistinct (that is, one cannot tell apart two events that have not happened yet) or because future and past events are objectively indefinite. Of course, the most likely presentist position is that the future and past are objectively indefinite as well as indistinct​[26]​.
	One of the main differences, then, between the presentist and eternalist regards the issue of subjective and objective indefiniteness. Is there a metaphysical difference between these two? The answer is most certainly “yes”. If one were to take the position of Newton’s god in the “5th dimension” outside of space-time and looking “down” on the whole of space-time—her “sensorium”, for instance, the difference would be abundantly clear. On the eternalist view, Newton’s god would see events in the past, present, and future. Though normal observers within space-time might believe the future and past to be objectively indefinite because no amount of information can determine the future with certainty for those “inside” this space-time, Newton’s god would be able to see the future as distinctly as she would see the present. Given presentism however, even Newton’s god could not see the future or the past and as such human ignorance of the future is a reflection of an objective indeterminateness of the dynamical unfolding of future events.​[27]​  Whereas in a blockworld Newton’s god would see an entire 4D block, in a presentist universe god would only see a 3D snapshot​[28]​. For diagrams of Newton’s god’s eye view of eternalism, presentism, possibilism, and point presentism respectively, please see Appendix B.
	Another way of viewing our “Newton’s god” argument here is in terms of “where” time is in the presentist picture compared to the eternalist picture. In the presentist picture, Newton’s god is still constrained by time. The fact that Newton’s god is removed from the strictures of the universe does not entail her separation from some notion of time in which she must still continue to exist. There is no way, then, for Newton’s god to “escape” time on the presentist picture. What is more, the presentist is essentially arguing that time is in some way an ontologically prior and distinct phenomenon to space since Newton’s god, freed from the universe, is still bound by the phenomenon of time. On the eternalist picture, however, Newton’s god is free from the strictures of temporality. It is unclear what the character of the 5D universe Newton’s god inhabits is (the 5th dimension could be conceived as some sort of second-order time, a 4th-order space, or some phenomenology of dimensions not currently experienced by human beings); however, the point is that Newton’s god is free from time as it exists in the universe since the two are inextricably linked, and thus time has been given the same ontological status as space on this picture. The eternalist does not have to argue that time behaves the same way as space does, simply that time is given the same ontological status as space, which is a stance that the presentist rejects.
	It would be absurd to argue, therefore, that two perspectives as different as these are, are in fact, metaphysically and empirically equivalent in principle; such a claim could only be sensible if one assumes an anthropocentric verificationism. For this reason, Dorato’s and Savitt’s claims must be dismissed. What these two authors have suggested in their writings is merely that a better definition of reality is necessary before the presentist/eternalist debate can be undertaken, and so, with such a definition provided, Dorato’s and Savitt’s claims of collapsing the dichotomy can be ignored. One might posit that such a god is question-begging since a god’s eye point of view would violate basic tenets of special relativity; however, one must note that Newton’s god is removed from the 4D-manifold (space-time) that she sees. Such a god would be constrained to see a space-time that conforms to special relativity even though this “god-frame” itself would not conform. Special relativity can only make claims about perceptions of space-time from within space-time, and since Newton’s god’s frame is outside of space-time, this relativistic objection does not obtain.
Using our new argument for the eternalist position, Dorato’s two previous objections to eternalism can be ignored as well. Nowhere in our argument do we claim that the past, present, and future are all “simultaneous”, nor is there any confusion between eternal truths about existence and the eternal persistence of events. First, an appeal to some sort of “second order” time is completely unnecessary for the eternalist position in our formulation of it, and as such the accompanying language of the “past present, and future existing simultaneously” has been disregarded. As noted above, Newton’s god’s frame need not necessarily be conceived as some sort of second order time; further, it is merely a thought experiment to show that Dorato/Savitt type arguments are dependent on verificationism of a sort special relativity need not entail. In the following passage Dainton​[29]​ paints a suggestive picture of what it means to take Newton’s god’s perspective of the BW seriously:

Imagine that I am a God-like being who has decided to design and then create a logically consistent universe with laws of nature similar to those that obtain in our universe…Since the universe will be of the block-variety I will have to create it as a whole: the beginning, middle and end will come into being together…Well, assume that our universe is a static block, even if it never ‘came into being’, it nonetheless exists (timelessly) as a coherent whole, containing a globally consistent spread of events. At the weakest level, “consistency” here simply means that the laws of logic are obeyed, but in the case of universes like our own, where there are universe-wide laws of nature, the consistency constraint is stronger: everything that happens is in accord with the laws of nature. In saying that the consistency is “global” I mean that the different parts of the universe all have to fit smoothly together, rather like the pieces of a well-made mosaic or jigsaw puzzle. 
 
We have dealt with this first objection of Dorato’s completely. We note that Dorato and Savitt are right to point out concerns with word choice in arguments such as ours and place appropriate and stringent conditions on how we define our positions, but generally speaking this is the most that linguistics can contribute to the debate between presentism and eternalism. It seems to us that the scholastic excesses and dead ends of the linguistic-turn-era in metaphysics ought to make one very skeptical that analyzing language can settle metaphysical debates in which there are real empirical differences between the positions, the most such arguments can show even if they worked is that “you can’t say that” or “here is a way to state and defend my position compatible with any metaphysical state of affairs.” We would say that consensus about Putnam’s BIV argument against global skepticism illustrates the first point and James’ claim about compatibilism—that it is a “quagmire of evasion”—illustrates the second. As to Dorato’s second objection, we do not claim that an event exists continuously but that it is eternally definite and distinct. Nowhere in this argument have we claimed that any event that exists at a certain time must exist forever. Thus, Dorato’s objections, though certainly fine objections to some formulations of eternalism, do not hold against our formulation of eternalism. In light of our definition of terms, then, there is no reason for the philosopher of language to reject our presentism/eternalism dichotomy or eternalism itself on linguistic grounds. In general, we do not believe that any metaphysical debate based on real empirical differences between positions can be collapsed simply by an appeal to linguistics. The most such appeals can do is determine that certain entities in the debate are “unspeakables” or that the language used must be clarified for the debate to proceed.
IV.2 The Transitivity of Reality 
	The new definition of an event’s reality as a combination of definiteness and distinctness also has implications for the second compatibilist objection to the RoS argument, namely that there is no good reason why reality or the “is co-real with” relation ought to be transitive. The first response to this claim is that any relativistically invariant relational property must be transitive across all reference frames. For example, consider the property of “light-likeness”. Any two events that are light-like separated share this property, and all observers in all frames will agree that two events are light-like separated if they are so due to the fact that the speed of light in a vacuum is a universal constant. Thus, if event A is light-like separated from event B and event B is light-like separated from event C, then event A must be light-like separated from event C. This deduction is true even if you add different relativistic frames into the equation. For instance, if event A is light-like separated from event B in a frame moving with velocity v and event B is light-like separated from event C in a frame moving with velocity u where u is not equal to v, it is still the case that event A and event C are light-like separated in a frame moving with velocity w no matter what the value of w​[30]​. Thus, from this simple example, one can see that a relativistic invariant quantity is transitive across inertial frames.
	There are two other relativistic invariant properties aside from “light-likeness” that we would like to discuss now. The first of these is number. All observers, no matter their frame, will agree on the number of events that occur. Thus, no matter what frame an observer is in, it will never be the case that she will see an event take place that an observer does not see. Though observers may disagree about some of the properties of an event, no observer will see a “novel” event; that is, there is no event simpliciter that one can only see if one is in a certain reference frame. This means that the very existence, the very definiteness of an event-as-such must be a relativistic invariant, and thus as per our pre-established criterion, definiteness must be transitive across frames.
	Another relativistic invariant is the space-time interval between two events. This separation is defined by the space-time metric as:
s2= t2- x2- y2- z2
Where “s” is the space-time interval, “t” represents time, and “x”, “y”, and “z” are spatial coordinates in 3-space. Because the interval between events is an invariant, it is always possible for observers in different frames to distinguish between different space-time events in a consistent manner. Because of this, no observer will confuse two events that are seen as distinct in another frame. Thus, the invariance of the space-time interval implies that distinctness is a relativistic invariant. Thus, as per our pre-established criterion, distinctness also must be transitive across frames.
	Now, since reality in our formulation has definiteness and distinctness as necessary and sufficient conditions and since both definiteness and distinctness are relativistic invariants, it follows that reality, the union of definiteness and distinctness, should also be a relativistic invariant. Finally, as has already been established, any relativistic invariant must be transitive across frames, and therefore reality must be transitive across frames. This argument suggests that, as a logical consequence of special relativity combined with our definition for reality, the frame-independent reality of the universe must obtain. This logic provides more than sufficient reasoning to support objectivity in our co-reality definition, and so the weight now falls on the shoulders of Savitt and the presentists to explain why “is real for” should not be transitive if they want to continue pushing this point.


IV.3 Against the Point Presentist
	There have been several arguments against the “here, now” presentist as Stein​[31]​ presents him. This variety of presentist holds the present to consist of a single point in space-time and defines the “now” as both temporal and spatial. There have already been several excellent responses to Stein’s view, most notably those provided by Cifone (2004) and Petkov​[32]​. We will here reiterate and rephrase Cifone’s and Petkov’s points to show that the “point” presentists, as they are traditionally called, do not hold a viable perspective.
	The first argument against point presentism comes from Cifone. As previously discussed, it is easy enough to see how anti-realism can be reduced to a form of point presentism, but the opposite seems true as well. Point presentists can be taken to be essentially solipsists since what exists at only one point (presumably, the point where the point presentist currently exists) is all that exists. This is not an argument in itself, and there are ways around point presentist solipsism, but these views are almost equally bad. If there is more than one “point present” for the point presentist (that is, if he rejects solipsism), what is required for a point to be “the present”? Is there some “present-maker” that defines the present, that selects it out from all possible “presents”? And if there is, what would such a “present-maker” be? What is more, if there are a large number of “presents” that all compose reality, why do none of them agree with each other? For if the present is only a single point, it follows that multiple “nows” will not count other “nows” as real. There will be no agreement among different observers in different frames, let alone different observers in the same frame, as to what constitutes reality. Thus, it seems that the point presentist loses all semblance of realism when he explains his position and runs the risk of having his position collapsed into absurdity.  
	Perhaps most damning to the point presentist, however, is Petkov’s response. Petkov points out that a point presentist reduces reality to a single, 0-dimensional point. If point presentism is the case, he asks, why does the universe appear to be four-dimensional, as evidenced by the aforementioned 4D space-time invariants? The universe defended by presentism which lacks the 4D-manifold in favor of a 3D universe seems unable to support or explain phenomena like length contraction and time dilation, but it appears nearly impossible to reconcile a 0-dimensional view of space-time with such phenomena. Such a view, Petkov argues, reduces to solipsism. After all, consider two observers A and B. If A and B are distinct observers, any observation event by observer A will not be real to observer B since only observer B’s “here and now” are real to him. This solipsism leads to the loss of realism that Cifone (2004) points out. Petkov also claims that only a 4D view is supported by special relativity by refuting the 3D picture of the world as well. His argument is that the phenomena of length contraction and time dilation, both of which allow different observers to hold ontologically distinct and correct beliefs about the 3D properties of an object, cannot be as completely described by a 3D worldview as by a 4D blockworld view. He compares the situation to looking at a 2D plane; one can certainly describe the plane as a series of lines in the x-direction for different, constant values in the y-direction, but this “complete” description of the phenomenon does not change the fact that it is a 2D plane and not a 1D line that is being described. If a 3D world is inadequate, then, it stands to reason that lower dimensional representations of spacetime would likewise be inadequate. Thus, the 0D description of the world presented by the point presentist must be incorrect. If one is to believe in the point presentist as a viable alternative to the eternalist and the traditional presentist, the point presentist must provide physical support for a 0D universe or else abandon his view.
	Before leaving point presentism, however, there is one perspective similar to Stein’s that advocates changing the definition of simultaneity in order to save the presentist from the RoS argument. This more recent shift is presented by Bourne​[33]​ and ought to be addressed here since it is a challenge to the notion of simultaneity we employ, a challenge that adheres to the logic that Stein originally used when proposing point presentism (see previous footnote). Bourne argues that simultaneity is absolute within space-time. According to Bourne, the notion of absolute reality does not translate into the language of relativity because no one can determine whether or not two events are simultaneous by observations within a frame. He turns simultaneity on its head in presentism, not by defining “what is real” by “what is present” but rather “what is present” by “what is real.” Bourne appeals to a linguistic analysis in terms of conjunction, instead of observables in the world as the basis for reality and thus simultaneity. In short, Bourne’s reinterpretation of simultaneity insists that simultaneity is absolute by ruling out the possibility of determining simultaneous events (or, it seems, reality) by observation alone.
	Bourne’s reinterpretation of simultaneity shows to what extremes presentists must go to rescue their philosophy of time from the RoS argument. By the time Bourne is finished with simultaneity, there is nothing resembling the common-sense notion of simultaneity left. Not only is simultaneity dictated as absolute without empirical evidence or verification (for surely one cannot appeal to physical grounds for such an argument), but simultaneity has now also been removed from the realm of science altogether. There is no longer any observation that can determine if two things occur at the same time! Not only does this assertion fly in the face of common-sense views of simultaneity, it also poses dire consequences for science and human knowledge when combined with presentism. If Bourne’s simultaneity gives us no access to a distinctively “real” character for “real” events, how can any empirical evidence help in determining which things are real and which things are not? Does linguistics then pose a better means to come to truths about the natural world than science does for Bourne? If we are planning on choosing a metaphysics of time that best accounts for the phenomena at hand without making any wild metaphysical claims, it seems clear that Bourne’s reinterpretation of simultaneity does not save presentism since even the claim that the past, present, and future are all equally real is a more conservative claim than that simultaneity and reality are both phenomena to which no one has empirical access.
	It is, however, possible that one can reinterpret Bourne’s claims about the simultaneity in physical terms; such a reinterpretation of Bourne’s simultaneity would necessitate a preferred foliation of space-time.​[34]​ Though we will not address Bourne’s simultaneity directly any further since he does not explain his simultaneity in terms of preferred foliations of space-time in any satisfying way, we will address preferred foliation presentists generally in the next section.

IV.4 Preferred Foliations in Space-Time
A slightly tougher objection to RoS is raised by those suggesting that space-time has a preferred foliation. Such a foliation would contradict the current beliefs not only about eternalism but about relativity as well, for one of the chief tenets of relativity as it is usually interpreted​[35]​ is that there exists no preferred reference frame The good news for the eternalist is that there is very little physical evidence​[36]​ to support such a preferred foliation, but it still remains possible that such a preferred foliation may be postulated. Assuming that such a foliation is found, then, does the RoS proof for BW above still follow?
	The first response to the preferred foliation objection is that no preferred foliation theory as it currently stands, even if it were proven to be true, provides the necessary physical mechanisms that would be necessary to explain why such a frame would be preferred. Until physical motivation for a preferred frame is provided, one cannot abandon the RoS argument. Perhaps there is some way in which the “now” transforms as it goes into other frames. Perhaps the “now”, though it is dependent on its preferred space-time foliation, is still present or still has metaphysical influence on other frames. Until physical motivation for a preferred reference frame is provided, one simply cannot know these things. After all, we do use CMBR (“cosmic time”) as a pragmatic preferred frame in physics but it does not impugn BW any more than proper time does. In a purely relativistic context the claim that the Big bang occurred 14 billion years ago is completely frame dependent, there are other possible, equally valid choices to be made. The point is that none of these invariant features internal to SR changes the fact that M4 has no resources to construct an absolute and objective preferred frame and that the RoS implies the reality of all events. On our view, one can always conventionally define a preferred frame such as cosmic time; however, unless one can show that a preferred frame a la a physical mechanism is the cause of physical effects like Lorentz contraction and time dilation (as opposed to being mere relativistic effects), a pragmatic-preferred frame of this sort does not negate BW. ​[37]​
	Callender’s​[38]​objection to the preferred foliation view, however, is perhaps stronger. Callender proposes a problem he calls the “coordination problem”. The idea is that even if there is a preferred reference frame​[39]​, there is no reason to believe that this reference frame would provide anyone with a suitable “now” upon which to base presentism. One must in some way prove that the physical preferred frame is precisely the same as the metaphysical preferred frame posited by the presentists. How would one be able to make such an association? And, perhaps more importantly, even if it were possible for one to argue that the physical and metaphysical preferred frames were, in fact, one in the same, how would this alter the presentist’s conception of the present?
	Let us try to cash out what it would mean to live in a universe in which a preferred frame forms the basis for an absolute reality. Imagine two twins who are born in such a preferred foliation of space-time. The absolute simultaneity of the preferred frame mandates that these two twins will agree on their ages at all points in time (twin 1, Alice, will turn 21 when twin 2, Bob, turns 21, etc.). However, if Bob decides to take a trip and leave the “real” foliation of space-time, the “absolutely simultaneous” events (picked out based on the preferred frame) involving Alice and Bob describe Alice and Bob as being different ages (Alice, perhaps, is 23 while Bob is only 22); however, whenever Alice and Bob interact directly with each other by shaking hands, giving each other a high five, etc., they will agree that they are both the same age. According to the preferred frame presentist, then, Bob’s leaving Alice’s frame changes his ontological status. His age and size physically change as he travels around the universe, yet Bob is completely unaware that he is undergoing these changes.
	This situation produces several problems for the presentist since she must explain why changing one’s velocity should cause one’s views about oneself to be more or less in line with “reality.” When I get in my car and drive to the store, for instance, I have changed my inertial frame; am I now closer to the “real” frame or farther from it? Either way, I don’t experience the immediate world differently, nor do I perceive any differences in myself, yet my ontological status has changed. What, then, is the basis for calling such a velocity shift a “shift into (or out of) delusion” since I notice no difference in myself when I speed up or slow down? The other problem for the preferred frame presentist is a related concern: if the preferred frame is what’s “real” but I experience the world in exactly the same way whether I’m in the preferred frame or not, why should I care about “reality”? What makes reality a meaningful concept to me if it is not linked with any physical, psychological, or epistemological change? For a preferred frame presentist, reality has no important implications other than to save presentism. Again, reality becomes distantly removed from our experiences, and though we may be able to convert all of our dimensions, temporal and spatial, into our “real” dimensions according to the preferred frame, these real dimensions will be no more important to our lives than our dimensions according to any other frame.
	In the end it seems like the preferred foliation proponent is providing a view that is perhaps as inimical to the presentist as to the eternalist. One of the major reasons why presentists hold the position they do is that it seems to agree with human manifest experience of time. If this experience were hung on some preferred frame due to microwave background radiation or preferred frames as posited by some Bohmians and collapse theorists, it would be possible for a “now” to exist that was completely alien to human experience. Does the phrase “now” even have any meaning when it has been removed from human perceptions of time? The burden falls to the presentists here to prove that a meaningful “now”, a physical preferred foliation of space-time, and an identical metaphysical preferred foliation of space-time are all compatible, and since no such reconciliation of all three of these ideas has been provided by the presentist camp, we are forced to conclude with Saunders​[40]​that the burden of proof in the presentism/eternalism debate lies entirely on the shoulders of presentists instead of with the eternalists because there is nothing obvious in the resources of M4 alone to be a preferred frame to ground presentism, at least nothing not ad hoc, merely pragmatic, or perspectival.

IV.5 The Spatial Presentist: Absurdity in Presentism? 
	Having answered the presentist objections of the RoS argument in turn, we would like to propose another argument along the same lines as the RoS argument which, we believe, should serve as a preemptive criticism against presentist arguments to come. Suppose that there exists a new kind of realist called a spatial presentist. The spatial presentist believes not that all events occurring simultaneously are real but that all events that occur in the same place are real. Perhaps there is a sphere (infinitesimally small, for our purposes) that the spatial presentist has set aside, following which he claims that “the only things that are real are those in this sphere”. One might ask, then, what would be real after the creation of the sphere at an event A in the following diagram, which shows, from relativistic considerations, what will be real:


Figure 2: Spatial Presentist Argument

From this diagram, it is clear that we are left in a situation directly analogous to the temporal presentist situation previously established in our RoS argument, for the above space-time diagram shows a property we will call the relativity of same position or RoSP. One can simply rotate our Figure 1 and make a RoSP argument to disprove spatial presentism in the same way that the RoS argument disproves temporal presentism. The arguments are completely symmetrical in the same way that RoSP is symmetrical with RoS.




	Though the traditional formulations of the Putnam, Rietdijk and SSC’s RoS argument for blockworld may be ill-defined in certain parts that leave the argument open to attacks by philosophers of language and presentists, the argument may be reformulated with more specific definitions that make eternalism the likely victor. Thus, the task before the presentist in defending herself has now become even grander, she must 1) find a way to dispel the RoS argument, 2) show why presentism is more likely than eternalism, and 3) integrate temporal asymmetry as fundamental to her argument lest her argument run the risk of establishing an obviously false view (spatial presentism) as well as it establishes her temporal presentism.​[42]​ It is clear from the forgoing that the most common presentist argument that “space and time are not perceived to act in the same way” is not sufficient to shoulder the weight of a full presentist defense, and thus a more developed presentist argument addressing all of our concerns must be proposed before presentism can escape from the jaws of the RoS argument. Again, we echo Saunders in stating that while eternalism in itself may not have been deductively established by our arguments, the burden falls upon the presentist to show why eternalism is not much more probable.
	 

VI. Appendix A: Against the Dynamical interpretation of Special Relativity

	Our argument relies on a kinematical (“principle” in Einstein’s language) interpretation of special relativity, but of late various people have defended a dynamical interpretation (“constructive” in Einstein’s language). In the following passage Callender explains why the latter interpretation is a potential problem for the RoS argument for BW:

In my opinion, by far the best way for the tenser to respond to Putnam et al. is to adopt the Lorentz 1915 interpretation of time dilation and Fitzgerald contraction.  Lorentz attributed these effects (and hence the famous null results regarding an aether) to the Lorentz invariance of the dynamical laws governing matter and radiation, not to spacetime structure.  On this view, Lorentz invariance is not a spacetime symmetry but a dynamical symmetry, and the special relativistic effects of dilation and contraction are not purely kinematical.  The background spacetime is Newtonian or neo-Newtonian, not Minkowskian.  Both Newtonian and neo-Newtonian spacetime include a global absolute simultaneity among their invariant structures (with Newtonian spacetime singling out one of neo-Newtonian spacetime’s many preferred inertial frames as the rest frame).  On this picture, there is no relativity of simultaneity and spacetime is uniquely decomposable into space and time.  Nonetheless, because matter and radiation transform between different frames via the Lorentz transformations, the theory is empirically adequate.  Putnam’s argument has no purchase here because Lorentz invariance has no repercussions for the structure of space and time.  Moreover, the theory shouldn’t be viewed as a desperate attempt to save absolute simultaneity in the face of the phenomena, but it should rather be viewed as a natural extension of the well-known Lorentz invariance of the free Maxwell equations.  The reason why some tensers have sought all manner of strange replacements for special relativity when this comparatively elegant theory exists is baffling (2006, 3).

See also Harvey Brown’s book Physical Relativity​[43]​ and his essay “Minkowski Space-time: A Glorious Non-Entity”​[44]​ co-authored with Oliver Pooley for a more developed argument for this stance.
	We can provide no knock-down argument against the dynamical interpretation of special relativity but we await a compelling argument justifying the dynamical explanation as a deeper explanation, or the ‘truer’ explanation, or even a more informative explanation. We believe the kinematical explanation provided by the structure of Minkowski space-time is the deepest explanation of relativistic effects. The demonstration that a dynamical interpretation yields the same result as the kinematical one shows nothing by itself. Brown and others argue that the dynamical interpretation is more unifying and more explanatory than the kinematical one. While this is an empirical question to be settled over the long haul we argue to the contrary for the following reasons. 
	First, as Callender​[45]​ notes “The main concern about the Lorentizan theory is that dynamical symmetries do not mirror spacetime symmetries on this view…Positing otherwise unnecessary unobservable structure—absolute simultaneity—does violence to Occham’s razor” (3). As Callender points out, Brown must posit a split between the symmetries of dynamical laws and the symmetries of space-time even though such a split is unmotivated. Brown may object to the kinematical interpretation because he believes that it posits extraneous metaphysical baggage, but does not his assumption that the symmetries in space-time and symmetries of dynamical laws should be completely different also imply equally extraneous metaphysical baggage?
	Second, Brown’s dynamical interpretation does not save the presentist since she must still face some of the problems raised in IV.4. For example, even if there is an absolute space-time and a universal moment of “the present”, there is no reason to believe, as per Callender’s objection discussed in Section IV.4, that such a present lines up with human experience of the present. What is more, as long as Lorentz contractions and dilations exist, one observer traveling at relativistic velocities may observe his present to be different from the “present” of those around him. Does that mean that, since he is dealing with “past” or “future” versions of these other beings, that they are not real since they are not actually experiencing the present simultaneously with the relativistic observer? There seems to be a suggestion of some sort of frame-dependent solipsism, which would constitute an anti-realism that presentists would reject as readily as eternalists.  




































Appendix B: A “God’s Eye” View of Space-Time on Different Theories of Time
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